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I. INTRODUCTION:
The Ottoman Empire
For centuries there has been an
Eastern Question. At different times, the pro-
blem has assumed various aspects, but in all ages
the basis of the question is the same the
conflict in creed, race, language, social customs,
and political aptitudes and traditions between
the East and the West. The essence of the problem
is then the presence of an alien race, the Ottoman
Turks, in Europe.
Long after the we stern part of the
Roman Empire had disintegrated, the eastern part
continued to maintain itself. For centuries the
Eastern Empire was battling for existence against
the Slavic hordes from the North who were invading
the Balkan region, and especially against the Mo-
hammedan tribes from the East who seized the Asiatic
possessions of the Empire and were constantly mak-
ing attacks on Constantinople. Finally in 1453
that ancient citadel was captured an event of
great importance, since it marks the actual begin-
ning of Turkish control in the Balkans, which has
furnished one of the most intricate problems
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European statesmen had even had to consider
the Eastern Question.
From Constantinople, the Ottomans
continued to advance and the height of their power
was attained with remarkable activity during the
reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). But
before the end of the sixteenth century, its zenith
was already passed. With the defeat of the Otto-
mans at the gates of Vienna, 1683, the advance of
the Moslem was finally arrested. For two and a
half centuries the Turks had been the scourge of
Christendom and had seriously threatened the se-
curity of the European countries. The menace was
now dissipated forever.
In the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies, the fundamental point at issue in the Eas-
tern Question was the future of the Ottoman Empire.
This vast empire had been for some time in a state
of political decay and disintegration, and, during
this period, was in danger of being conquered by
foreign powers. Russia had since the time of
Catherine II been pushing her way southward, by
seizing Turkish soil. At one time it seemed as
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if Russia and Austria would divide the spoils
between them, at another that Napoleon would
direct his restless activity in the direction
of the Eastern Mediterranean. But the interests
of European politics had kept those powers other-
wise occupied, and had frustrated whatever designs
they had had upon the Sultan’s possessions. But
there was another menace. The immediate danger
was not from without but from within.
The government of the Sultan was in-
efficient, its mechanism of control of its agents
deplorably defective. The result was that in va-
rious parts of the empire those agents were using
their power to found for themselves virtually
independent states, as for example Tunis and Al-
giers. In European Turkey, Ali of Janina was
endeavoring to accomplish the same thing in Al-
bania. The military system of the empire, once
the terror of Europe, was now in decay, and the
main object of a century had been defense not
offense; yet even that was beyond the competence
of the government.
Pull of contempt for those whom they
had conquered, the Turks made no attempt to as-
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similate them into one nation. They were satis-
V
fied with reducing them to subjection, and with
exploiting them. They left them in a kind of
partial independence as far as administration
was concerned, allowing them local autonomy.
These subjects were permitted the free exercise
of their religion, contrary to the teachings of
the Koran. But while they enjoyed certain privi-
leges they possessed no rights. Their property
might be confiscated, or even their lives taken
in any moment of anger or suspicion on the part
of their rulers. The Turks neither crushed nor
conciliated. their alien subjects.
This inner decay of the Ottoman Em-
pire, together with the rise of Russia, and the
far reaching effects of the French Revolution, re-
sulting first in the rise of the Serbs in 1804-
1830, and later the struggle for Greek independence
1821-1829, brought the attention of the statesmen
of Europe to the development of events in Turkey.
The Purpose of the Thesis
It is the purpose of this thesis to
trace briefly the advance of the Russians, as may
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be seen from the important treaties, during the
last part of the eighteenth century and the first
half of the nineteenth; the Napoleonic period in
its effect upon the Near East; the struggle for
Greek independence and the interest taken in it
by the European powers; the activities in diplomacy
of the powers during and after the rise of the Sul-
tan’s vassal, Mehemet Ali of Egypt; the growing
distrust between Great Britain and Russia; and the
long series of diplomatic negotiations immediately
preceding the Crimean War. With this last involved
topic, this thesis will be chiefly concerned.
II. TURKEY AND RUSSIA - TREATY RELATIONS 1774-1813
The Treaty of Kutsch.uk-Kainard.ji
The most fundamental and far reaching
of all the treaties signed by Russia and Turkey was
the treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardji, 1774. Upon this
important text, all the other treaties, executed
by the two Powers, rest. In 1852 on the eve of the
Crimean War, Nicholas I appealed to this treaty in
his attempt to retain the influence of the Greek
Monks in the guardianship of the Holy Places. Its
provisions may be, for our purposes, briefly stated.
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(1) Russia restored to the Porte most of the ter-
ritories she recently occupied: Bessarabia, Mol-
davia, Wallachia and the islands of the Archipelago,
but only on the condition of "better government in
general, and of particular privileges in regard to
diplomatic representation, and above all to religion.
In regard to the territories the Porte (Arts. XVI,
XVII and XXIII) definitely promised ’to obstruct in
no manner whatsoever the free exercise of the Christian
religion, and to interpose no obstacle to the erection
of new Churches and to the repairing of old ones’ M ."
These provisions, according to Russia, gave her
a treaty right of intervention in the internal af-
fairs of Turkey. (2) For herself, Russia gained
a foothold on the Black Sea, as well as (3) Trading
rights and commercial navigation in the Black Sea
and the Danube "with all the same privileges and
advantages as are enjoyed by the most friendly na-
tions whom the Sublime Porte favours most in trade,
such as the French and English". (Art. XI) ^ (4) In
regard to diplomatic changes, Russia was to have a
1. Marriott, p.153
2. Holland, p.42-43.
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permanent ambassador at the Porte who was made
protector of a Greek church which Russia re-
ceived the right to erect. In addition, Russian
subjects were to be allowed to make pilgrimages
to Jerusalem and the Holy Places; and the Sultan
undertook to “protect constantly the Christian
religion and its churches"
. The Porte also al-
lowed "the ministers of the imperial court of
Russia to make upon all occasions, representations
as well in favour of the new church at Constanti-
nople as on behalf of its officiating ministers,
promising to take such representations into due
consideration as being made by a confidential
functionary of a neighboring and sincerely friend-
ly power”. (Art XII - XIV)
1
The pre-eminent significance of the
Treaty of Kainardji cannot be minimized. It marks
the beginning of real Russian influence in Turkey;
upon it Russia based her claim, however vague, to
exercise the guardianship of the Christian races
and Orthodox Church.
The Treaty of Jassy
From the time of Peter the Great, it
can be clearly seen that Russia had designs on
1. Holland p,44
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Constantinople
,
whose great claim to fame lies in
the fact that it is the gateway to the east. To
achieve this goal, the Turks must be driven from
Europe. Such was Catherine’s dream. The support
of the Austrians, however, was essential to its
realization. After the expulsion of the Turks,
the partition of his possessions would be a simple
matter. It is interesting to note that the princi-
ple of nationalism is entirely lacking in the scheme.
The project was not realized, however, but in 1783
Catherine annexed the Crimea and fortresses were
immediately erected.
Russian agents, meanwhile, had been
stirring up discontent among the Greeks, Slavs and
Roumanians. Of course the Sultan Abdul Hamid was
alarmed, and when Catherine in formulating her im-
mediate demands, forced him to surrender Bessarabia
to Russia, and to permit the establishment of
hereditary governors in Moldavia and Wallachia,
his anger was fully aroused. He issued a manifesto
condemning the advance of Russia, particularly the
seizure of the Crimea in time of peace. In August
1787 he declared war on Russia.
..
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At this point, a new phase of the
Eastern Question was presenting itself the
concern of the European powers in the development
of events in the Near East. France has always
been interested, if only for commercial considera-
tions, in the Levant; Prussia was in the process
of formulating a diplomatic system; while England
who had so far been curiously disinterested in
Eastern Europe, under the younger Pitt now began
to realize the importance of English interests in
the Near East and to perceive that those interests
might be in danger with the dissolution of the
Ottoman Empire. The formation of the Triple Alli-
ance in 1788 of which Great Britain, Prussia and
the United Provinces were members, had as one of
its motives, the desire to circumscribe Russia in
the Near East.
To return to the war in the east
Austria in keeping with her Russian alliance de-
clared war on the Sultan in February 1788. The
campaign continued with strategic gains on the
part of Russia in the capture of Oczakov, and on
the part of Austria in Belgrade and Semendria. A
combination of events, however, disposed the bel-
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ligerents to peace. Selim III succeeded Abdul
Hamid in 1789; the accession of Leopold in Austria
in 1790 changed the policy of that country; and
more important, the French Revolution diverted the
attention of all the European governments. As a
result, Austria and the Porte concluded peace in
1791 whereby Serbia and the "status quo ante" were
restored. The treaty of Jassy was signed by Russia
and Turkey in 1792. The famous treaty of Kainardji,
together with the commercial treaty of 1785, was
confirmed; Moldavia v/as restored to the Porte on
condition that the Sultan maintain the terms of the
preceding treaties in regard to it, Oczakov was
transferred to Russia, and the Porte submitted to
the annexation of the Crimea.
The treaty of Jassy brings to a close
the advance of the Russians into the Balkans in the
eighteenth century: "Russia is firmly entrenched
upon the shores of the Euxine, and is already look-
ing beyond them. Kherson and Sebastopol have been
transformed into great naval arsenals; to the
north of the Euxine, Turkish territory ends at the
Dniester, and the border provinces between the Dnies
ter and the Danube are retained only on sufferance.
..
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Upon the lands to the south of the Euxine the Tur-
kish hold is already loosening. 'I carne to Russia’,
said Catherine, 'a poor girl; Russia has endowed
me richly, but I have paid her back with Azov, the
Crimea and the Ukraine ’ . Proudly spoken, it was
less than the truth.
The Influence of Napoleon
For the next twenty-five years, the
whole of Europe was occupied with the march of events
brought about by the French Revolution and the in-
satiable ambitions of Napoleon. The most important
result of the period insofar as the Eastern Question
is concerned is the new spirit of national conscious-
ness that was awakened in the peoples of the Balkans
by the democratic ideas which were apread throughout
Europe by the French Revolution. As for the designs
of Napoleon, from the very beginning his goal was
England which was to be reached, not across the
Channel a direct invasion would be fatal to the
French but through Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia and
Egypt, stepping stones to India. Finding himself in
a precarious position in Egypt after Nelson’s victory
of the Nile, Napoleon returned to Europe and having
effected the coup d’etat proceeded to detach Russia
1. Marriott p. 163-164.
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from the coalition against Prance. The destruction
of British power in the Par East was still his ulti-
mate aim. The Tzar Alexander I, who in 1801 had
succeeded his half-crazed father Paul, was drav/n
into an alliance with Napoleon after the Peace of
Tilsit whereby in exchange for Russian aid in the
campaign against England, Prance would compensate
Russia with Finland and the partition of the Ottoman
Empire. The actual apportionment of the Empire, how-
ever, was not specified; and the question of the pos-
session of Constantinople was left dangling. It is
quite clear that Napoleon was tempting Alexander with
grandiose schemes in the East in order to secure Rus-
sia as an ally, which, in view of the vigorous poli-
cies of Canning and the English activities in Portugal
and Spain, Prance was sorely in need.
In the meanwhile, the Sultan found him-
self involved in one of the most difficult crises
of his reign. The seed of the French Revolution,
together with the military experience earned in
their struggles against Napoleon, brought about in-
surrection among the Serbs in 1804 against the
Janissaries, the insurgent military agents of the
Sultan. Russian support was given the Serbs, and
..
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the Sultan found himself beset on all sides. He,
having been informed of Alexander’s intrigues in
the Tilsit conspiracy, violated his treaty agree-
ments with the Tzar and deposed the native rulers
of Moldavia and Wallachia. The Tzar retaliated by
sending his army to occupy the principalities.
Thereupon v/ar was declared in 1806. But the Sultan
found it necessary to temporize with Russia, be-
cause of his problem with the Serbs. In this
Serbian revolution, incidentally, we have the first
national uprising in the modern history of the Bal-
kans. In 1830, after internal jealousies among the
Serbs themselves, long negotiations, and foreign com-
plications, autonomy was granted to them.
To return to the alliance between
Napoleon and Alexander, the conflict of objectives
of the two emperors the Tzar wanted Constantinople
and Napoleon wanted the humiliation of England
gave rise to strained relations between them. At
their second meeting at Erfurt in October 1808, the
larger plans of the partition were put aside, but
the Danubian Principalities were promised to the
Tzar. It will be remembered that the Russian army
.-
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had been occupying them since 1806. In 1809 war
was resumed between Turkey and Russia which was con-
tinued in a fitful manner by both the belligerents.
The Treaty of Bucharest
But a new factor is to be considered,
one of immense significance for our diplomatic study,
since the Eastern Question now definitely enters a
period wherein the personal influence and activities
of the ministers are of tremendous importance. At
this most difficult moment in European history, when
a state of warfare existed all over the continent
since Napoleon controlled it there came to the
Porte as English Ambassador Sir Stratford Canning,
first Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe, whose personal
prestige at Constantinople through times of severe
strain, laid the foundation for that influence which
England has since been able to exert there. Eis
task was a momentous one. Proceeding entirely upon
his own initiative and without instructions from
home, he was in general to induce Turkey to prefer
the influence of England to that of Prance at a time
when France meant nearly all of Europe^ and when
1. See page 13
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Napoleon was making a desperate effort to secure
the support of the Sultan in his recently formu-
lated Russian Campaign. Specifically, he was to
effect a reconciliation between the Tzar and the
Sultan in order to set Russia free to repel Na-
poleon’s invasion of Russia. ~ The former was
desirous of peace for financial and political rea-
sons. On the other hand, the Sultan, difficult
under ordinary conditions to placate, v/as even more
so at this moment because of Napoleon’s offer and
also because of the recent successes of the Turkish
army on the Danube, although the balance of victory
was decidedly on the Russian side. Yet Stratford
gradually won his way into the confidence of the
Sultan by stressing the effect of the successes of
Wellington in the peninsular Campaign upon Napoleon’s
position. At length the Porte granted him unusual
powers by inviting him to open negotiations with
the Tzar’s plenipotentiary at Bucharest.
For a time it seemed as if it would be
impossible to affect a reconcilation. Russia
wanted peace on the basis of the cession of the
principalities, and Turkey. hoped to get out of the
1. See Lane-Poole, Chapter IV, for Stratford in 1813.
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difficulty without losing land. Stratford, how-
ever, held a master key. He had obtained a secret
paper in which France and Austria proposed to join
Turkey in an attack on Russia. More than ever did
Russia desire peace. But Turkey would make no con-
cessions. Stratford had still another weapon
a secret paper, planning the invasion and partition
of Turkey drawn up at Vienna v/ith Napoleon’s know-
ledge and approval. With this final stroke, the
problem was solved and peace was signed at Bucharest
May 28, 1812.
The terms of this treaty are not im-
portant in themselves. The only territorial gain
by Russia was the acquisition of Bessarabia, which
extended her southern boundary to the River Pruth.
In regard to the principalities, the stipulations
of better government as provided for in the Treaties
of Kainardji and Jassy, were to be observed. The
true significance of the Treaty of Bucharest lies
in the fact, that since it was brought about through
the efforts of Stratford, it established English in-
fluence at the Porte, but more important it enabled
the Russian Army of the Danube to be concentrated
..
.
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in Russia to aggravate the discomfort of the
French army in its retreat from Moscow.
On the surface, it seems that the
events of the quarter of a century from the Treaty
of Jassy to the Treaty of Bucharest are of little
value. The under currents of revolution, democracy,
and nationalism brought forth by this period are
intangible, yet the importance of them can be clear-
ly seen in the struggle for Greek independence
the topic to be considered forthwith.
THE STRUGGLE FOR GREEK INDEPENDENCE
With the causes of the revolt in Greece,
and with the steps in the actual attainment of in-
dependence we shall, of necessity, be unconcerned, ex-
cept insofar as they affect the diplomatic relations
of the European powers. In 1821 occurred the initial
rising of the Greeks. During the following six years,
with utter atrocity on both sides, the war continued,
ineffectually prosecuted by Turkey which seemed at
some moments almost within grasp of victory; while
on the other side the Greeks were unable to cooperate
with one another. Handicapped by her own incompe-
tence,Turkey called for aid from Mehemet Ali, Pasha
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of Egypt and vassal to the Sultan, the signifi-
cance of which request will be seen later. Under
Ibrahim, son of the Pasha, the well-trained and
disciplined army of the Egyptian ruler succeeded
in capturing the Greek strongholds, Missolonghi and
Athens
.
At this low tide of misfortune, the
Greeks were rescued by the decision of the foreign
powers to intervene. If it had not been for this
intervention, the vassal of the Sultan would no
doubt have rescued the Ottoman Empire from dis-
memberment
.
Interest of the Fowers
The action of the powers in -the inter-
vening in the struggle was due to several reasons.
The sympathy of cultivated people, notably Lord
Byron, had been aroused for the Greeks; Philhellenic
societies were founded in all countries; and it
seemed that public opinion would get beyond the
control of the governments. In Austria, Metternich
the opponent of revolutions in any country, was
able to prevent intervention for several years.
In Russia, Nicholas I succeeded Alexander in 1825.
His reactionary ideas were entirely different from
1. See page 25
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his liberal predecessor. Further, he did not feel
bound by the Holy Alliance; and although he desired
intervention in favour of Greece, he preferred his
own cause to theirs. In France, both liberals and
conservatives favored the Greeks, because they be-
lieved that by the creation of a new state, the
Holy Alliance, so humiliating to France, might be
undermined. Commercial interests in France as well
as in England were also concerned. In England, the
Philhellenic sentiment was strong, but more impor-
tant, the foreign office came under the control of
George Canning who had his heart set on liberation
of the Greeks, without the use of force, however.
On the other hand England did not want Russia to
move alone. Stratford Canning, cousin to George,
on his way to the Porte after an absence of twelve
years, stopped off at St . Petersburg to confer with
the Tzar on the Greek question and to persuade him
to follow George Canniig ’ s policy of no coercion.
Although he did not see Nicholas, he was able by his
judicious conversations with Count Nesselrode, the
Russian foreign minister, to prepare the way for the
Protocol of St .Petersburg, April 4,1826. By this dis-
patch the two powers offered mediation to the Porte.
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The Treaty of London
But the Sultan,having tasted victory
through the aid of Mehemet Ali and Ihrahim, and
left master in his own house by the overthrow of
the Janissaries, refused mediation that was not
backed by force. The condition of the Greeks was
desperate. Accordingly, the three powers, Russia,
England and France drew up the Treaty of London, 1827,
whereby they, on the grounds that the conflict was
of general concern owing to the injuries to com-
merce in the Levant, agreed to demand an armistice
of Mahmud II and his consent to the erection of Greece
an autonomous state under Turkish sovereignty. The
Sultan refused.
Then occurred the famous battle of
Navarino! The English and French admirals had
manoeuvred their vessels into Navarino Bay to re-
monstrate with Ibrahim who, since the foreign ves-
sels cut him off at sea, was prosecuting war on
land with great atrocity. The Turks fired on an
English ship and the struggle was on. Before night-
fall the Turko-Egyptian fleet had disappeared. Both
Wellington, who became Secretary of Foreign Affairs
on the death of George Canning, two months before.
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and Stratford Canning at the Porte disapproved of
the action at Eavarino. The Sultan was indignant
and demanded reparations and apologies. Although
these demands were refused, the British Government
attempted to smooth things over by conciliatory
statements
.
Wellington’s Unwise Move
The succession of Wellington to the
foreign office caused an about-face in the policy
of England in the difficulties in the East. Eis
policy was hesitating, hazy,and unwise. No attempt
was made to enforce the Treaty of London and things
were allowed to drift. Turkey, of course, benefitted.
She was ’’encouraged to persist in her attitude to-
wards Greece, and to renew her quarrel with Russia.
Russia was permitted, and even compelled, to engage
single handed in war with the Turks. Thus all the
fruits of years of diplomacy on Canning’s part were
carelessly dissipated in a few months by his suc-
„
1
cessors"
.
Russian-Turkish War 1828-29
In the meantime, the Sultan issued an
imprudent manifesto to the Tzar which gave Russia
1. Marriott
yp.221.
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the pretext of the war of 1828-1829 though Nicholas
denied any projects of territorial aggrandizement
and professed merely to maintain the status quo in
the East, The execution of the protocol between
Prance and England in July 1828, providing for im-
mediate action against Ibrahim in Greece, was,
through the "hands-off" policy of Wellington, car-
ried out by the French alone. This is of importance
since it afforded France an opportunity to establish
herself in the good graces of the Pasha of Egypt
which had its influence on the French policy in
1
Egypt in the next decade.
The Treaty of Adrianople
Turkey was at the mercy of Russia in
1829 and the Treaty of Adrianople, drawn up in that
year, is of particular significance because of the
distrust and antagonism it aroused on the part of
the other European powers, who feared the increased-
influence of Russia at the Porte, The terms of the
peace granted practical, but not nominal, autonomy
to the principalities under Russian protection, the
free navigation of neutral vessels in the Black Sea,
and the acceptance by the Porte of the Treaty of
1, See page 25
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London, in regard to the independence of Greece.
Certain important conclusions are to
he gleaned from the facts just related. "For the
first time the future of the Ottoman Empire was
recognized as a matter of profound concern not
merely to the Porte itself, to Russia and to Aus-
tria, hut to Europe as a whole, and not least to
Great Britain. For the first time an Ottoman Sul-
tan of exceptional vigour and disposed to reform,
had heen compelled to call to his aid an ambitious
vassal, and despite that assistance to consent to
terms of peace dictated by the Powers and involv-
ing the partial dismemberment of his European do-
minions
.
IV. THE POWERS 1830-1841
In the quarter century following the
Treaties of Adrianople and London, the Conservative
System established by the Congress of Vienna in
1815 and upheld by the Holy Alliance, suffered many
attacks. Throughout the period it is most interest
ing to watch the changing conditions, the gradual
substitution of liberalism for conservatism, and
1 Marriott, p.224
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the shifting jealousies and new alliances among
the European powers.
In the first place, the French Revolu-
tion of July 1830 aggravated the situation in Europe.
In the face of this new uprising, the Holy Alliance
showed a want of power which can be attributed to
the fact that the neighboring countries of France
felt safe from the terrorism and military invasion
that followed the revolution of 1789, because the
question at issue was merely one of liberalism.
Further attacks on the system of 1815 may be seen
in the uprisings in Belgium, and Poland. In the case
of Belgium, war between France and England was
averted through the skillful diplomacy of Lord
Palmerston, who in exchange for French consent to
the independence of Belgium, as a neutral state,
the
recognized/new monarch, Louis Philippe, established
by the revolution of 1830. In the revolt of the
Poles against Russia, England refused to aid its
ancient ally of 1815 # France favored the Poles, and
even Austria, because of her Catholic interests,
remained neutral. Hence we have Russia alone fol-
lowing the reactionary policies laid down by the
Congress of Vienna.
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Mehemet Ali
In the East, the Sultan -was faced with
a new humiliation the rise of Mehemet Ali. As
compensation for his aid to the Sultan during the
uprising of the Greeks, the Pasha of Egypt received
Crete. But a little is frequently too much. Mehemet
Ali demanded more, and attempted to make himself mas-
ter of Egypt and Syria. He had had valuable military
experience in the Napoleonic period. The first step
in his plan was the invasion of Syria, November 1831.
In the war between the vassal and the Sultan, that
in
was subsequently declared/May 1832, the weakness
military, naval and political of the Ottoman
Empire was once more revealed. Sultan Mahmud 1 s
hatred of Mehemet Ali and his inability to bring
about peace forced him to appeal to the powers for
aid.
In the difficult years of the early
i50 ! s, however, no power but Russia was willing to
offer him aid. France had been frienddy to Mehemet
Ali since the Protocol of 1828"^ and also considered
the creation of a new state in Egypt beneficial to
her trade in the Levant. Austria, still under
1. See page 22.
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Metternich, preferred to leave the Turks to their
own fate. As for England, the democratic reform
of 1832 occupied her attention. Stratford Canning
from his post at the rorue urged the support of his
government. At home, Palmerston was convinced of
the ability of the Sultan to put his house in order
and was well aware of the importance of retaining
the Turkish Empire as a barrier between Russia and
the Mediterranean. But the government, especially
in the precarious domestic situation in which it
was placed, refused to risk the breach with Russia
and France. Consequently in his desperate need,
the Sultan was forced to accept Russian aid.
On her side, Russia had definite rea-
sons to assume again the leading role in the East.
Her ancient ambitions at the Porte were her primary
motive, but, in addition, she feared for the secur-
ity of the rights and privileges already attained,
in the event of the success of Mehemet Ali. Ac-
cordingly, twelve thousand Russian troops and a
naval squadron were dispatched to Constantinople.
The Western Powers were alarmed at
this new advance of Russia, and their ministers at
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the Porte sought to dissuade the Sultan from
accepting the Tzar’s assistance. But what could
the Sultan do? The admonitions of the Western
Powers were not substantiated with military force
and Mehemet Ali refused to cease threatening Con-
stantinople until he received Syria, part of
Mesopotamia, and Adana.
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
By the Convention of Kutaya, April
1833, Mehemet All’s demands were granted, but Rus-
sia was still to be paid off. Through the negotia-
tions of Count Orloff, recently appointed plenipo-
tentiary at the Porte, the Tzar exacted in return
for his support to the Sultan, the treaty of Unkiar
Skelessi which practically placed Turkey under the
protection of Russia. Turkey granted Russia the
right to interfere in defense of the Porte, the
Dardanelles were closed to ships of war of other
Powers, and the Black Sea became a Russian lake.
No treaty in the history of the rela-
tions between Russia and Turkey ever caused such a
furor among the Western Powers, especially England
as was created by the. Treaty of Unkiar- Skelessi.
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The true designs of Russia were placed before the
minds of the statesmen of Europe, Palmerston in
particular, either the dismemberment of the
Ottoman Empire, or better still, the continuation
of it under Russian control. Palmerston, in vain,
protested against the treaty at both St . Petersburg
and at Constantinople, and even sent the Mediterra-
nean squadron to cruise in the Dardanelles. War
seemed imminent; but in 1833 the Western Powers
could not support such a conflagration and contented
themselves with the assurance of the Tzar that in
spite of the rights conferred upon him by the treaty,
he had no desire to use them against the Powers in
the West. Nevertheless, the question remained an
open one. Growing distrust of England toward the
Russian policy of aggrandizement in the East became
more evident.
Although Sultan Mahmud yielded to his
vassal in 1833, he was eager to be revenged upon
him. He constantly thwarted Mehemet All’s attempt
to establish stable government among the Syrians
by stirring up revolts among the tribes. On his
side, Mehemet Ali, made no secret of his desire to
(
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found a hereditary dynasty. Relations became more
and more strained, and in 1839 the war for the re-
conquest of the Syrian lands began.
In Europe the situation was as usual
quite complicated
.
The alliance formed by England
and France, after the establishment of the July
Monarchy, gave evidence of weakness and mutual dis-
trust. With Palmerston, ever since the Treaty of
Unkiar- Skelessi
,
the maintenance of the integrity
of the Ottoman Empire was a dogma, and Mehemet Ali
was looked upon as a menace to that integrity. But
France, although she was anxious to prevent the
Russian control of the Bosphorus, was equally con-
cerned in establishing Mehemet Ali in ‘Egypt. Nicholas
on his side was unwilling to submit the issue to a
conference, as was suggested by Metternich, because
he realized that the Powers in concert would take
from him the privileges he had gained in the straits.
The Egyptian Rebellion
Under these difficult circumstances,
the news came to Europe that the Egyptian had again
overrun Syria, delivered a crushing blow to the Turks
at the battle of Nezib, and by the treachery of the
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Turkish admiral, had obtained possession of the
Ottoman fleet. The Sultan, without army or navy
was saved from his dilemma by the decision of the
five powers
,
Austria, England, Prance, Prussia and
Russia, to act in concert on the Eastern Question.
But the five powers could not agree in
the settlement the cause of which lay in the in-
creasing alienation between Prance and England. A
crisis was again at hand. Mutterings of war were
heard in London and Paris. Russia was eager to
join in an alliance which would break down the cor-
dial understanding between England and France. Hence
Nicholas, to satisfy England, declared abolished the
Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi
.
Even though many of the
English cabinet feared a break with France, Palmer-
ston, in his calm way, assured them that Louis
Philippe and Thiers, President of the Ministry,
would not fight, nor would Mehemet Ali resist the
combined powers. Under these conditions Palmerston
found it necessary, July 15,1840, to enter into an
alliance with every power he suspected and accordingly
the. Quadruple Alliance of England, Russia, Prussia
and Austria was concluded. France found herself
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ls olated as in 1815 with. Europe arrayed against
her
.
By the terms of the Convention of
1840, the Sultan agreed to confer upon Mehemet
the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt, and for life,
the administration of Southern Syria; and the powers
agreed to carry out the treaty without France, and
if necessary against France. The treaty had been
signed without the knowledge of France and of Thiers,
who, when he learned of it, was prepared to lead
France into war. However, "constitutional states
possess this advantage, that they can easily escape
from an embarrassing position by a change of minis-
try. A Cabinet which has compromised the country
is succeeded by another; and, as the new ministers
are ordinarily chosen from among those who have
turned out the previous ones, the latter find it
easy enough to effect their retreat. That is what
took place in France".'*’
The Treaty of the Straits, 1841
Palmerston was right: Louis Philippe
would not fight. In the following year, France
under the conciliatory leadership of Guizot was al-
lowed to join the powers. The Egyptian Question
1. Diplomatic Study, Vol.I, p.9.
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was soon settled. Mehemet All was recognized as
hereditary ruler of Egypt under the suzerainty of
the Sultan; the straits were closed to ships of war
of every nation; and Turkey was placed under the
protection of the Powers. The Treaty of Unkiar-
Skelessi was wiped out. "The European crisis was
successfully surmounted, thanks partly to the paci-
fic disposition of Guizot and his bourgeois King,
thanks even more to the incomparable self-confidence
and undeviating firmness with which Lord Palmerston
1
had conducted a series of difficult negotiations."
V. THE POWERS 1841-1852
At the close of the difficult period
described above, it can be seen that Nicholas, in
his effort to abase France and satisfy England,had
lost all the rights and privileges that he had gained
by the Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi; and realized, more
strongly than ever, that the Eastern Question was
one for all the powers of Europe to settle and not.
for Russia alone. He was convinced that the attain-
ment of Russian interests at the Porte could only
be completed in alliance with England. He resolved
1. Marriott; p.244.
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frankly and honestly to present a solution of the
Eastern Question to England.
Nicholas 1 visit to St, James 1844
With this in mind, he paid a visit to
England in 1844, supposedly to congratulate Victoria
on her accession to the throne, but really to come
to an agreement with Great Britain on -the Turkish
Question. It v/as on this occasion that Nicholas
made his first suggestion for the dismemberment of
the Ottoman Empire. A memorandum from Count Nessel-
rode to the British Government, based on the com-
munications of the Emperor Nicholas during his stay
in London, is quite clear on this point.'
5
' The Tzar
declared that in regard to Turkey, he had no idea
of territorial conquest; and that his primary inter-
est was to maintain the status quo in the Ottoman
Empire as founded on treaties and to preserve the
religious and political privileges granted to the
Christians of the Empire. He recognized that the
interests of England were equally concerned with
these principles and suggested that the English
Cabinet should associate itself frankly with him in
order to guarantee the maintenance of Turkey and to
1. Diplomatic Study, Vol.I, p.12,13,14.

-34-
preserve the general peace. For this purpose, it
is necessary "to allow the Porte to live in peace
without agitating it by diplomatic worries, and
without interfering in its internal affairs."
(It will be noticed later that the Tzar did not re-
frain from "interfering in its internal affairs" on
the eve of the Crimean War.) Two difficulties pre-
sent themselves in effecting Turkish integrity: (1)
The Porte must be shown that it cannot free itself
from treaty agreements as it has in the past by rely
ing on the mutual jealousies of the Christian powers
that the cabinets will unite in forcing the Porte to
fulfill its obligations to one or all of the Powers.
(2) The difficulty that prevails within the Turkish
Empire to unite the opposing interests of religions
in Mussulman law and Christian interests in regard to
the sovereignty of the Sultan must be removed.
The Tzar, however, believed that there
were evidences of dissolution within this empire.
"The danger which may result from a catastrophe in
Turkey, will be much diminished if, the case occur-
ring, Russia and England understand one another as
2
to the course to be pursued by both in common."
1. Diplomatic Study, Vol.I, p.12
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With. such, an agreement and with the assent of
Austria, which was an accepted fact with Nicholas,
France would he obliged to concur with the three
powers and all possibility of conflict and the en-
suing disruption of the peace of Europe would be
averted.
It is interesting to ponder upon the
result had these plans been followed through. Cer-
tainly it cannot be denied that England, when the
division of the Ottoman Empire was eventually ac-
complished after the last great war, received the
lion’s share.
But to return to the visit of Nicholas
at St. James in 1844, his proposals, although they
were not approved, viere not actually condemned.
Nesselrode’s Memorandum on these negotiations, sent
to England, was filed without protest in the archives
of the Foreign Office and remained there for ten
years. It was evident that the pacifist Lord Aber-
deen was impressed. This has a particular signifi-
cance. Nicholas was predisposed to count on the
extreme cordiality of his relations with the English
court. He also assumed that Cobden and Bright had
made the English a pacific nation. "The Tsar had
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drawn from his conversations in London an inference,
even more erroneous: that under no circumstances, so
long as Lord Aberdeen controlled its destinies, would
Great Britain draw the sword. In these mutual mis-
understandings we have, perhaps, a warning against
1 amateur 1 diplomacy. That they were, in part, re-
sponsible for a most unhappy war cannot be denied."^
Turkish Reform
In the next five years, all the powers
involved In the difficult Eastern Question were oc-
cupied with internal affairs. The Porte was con-
cerned with reform under the leadership of Reshid
Pasha who in turn was influenced by the Great Elchi,
Sir Stratford de Redcliffe. The Sultan had been at-
tempting to put his house in order, a movement which
was destined to failure even though many statesmen
of Europe, Palmerston in particular, believed that
reform was highly probable. The Hatti-Sherif of
Gulhane, proclaimed by the Sultan in 1839, had
promised to all Ottoman subjects, without distinc-
tion of race or creed, security of life, honor, and
property, the equitable distribution of taxes, the
public trial of prisoners, and the right of all to
1. Marriott^ p.248
'.
-
•
.
,
t
•
' f
.
t
-JS'i V
.
.
.
.
.
r
.
.
“
.
'
.
.
4
-57-
devise property. Yet justice was not done to
Christians , and their lives, honor and property were
not safe. The attempt to put Christians and Moslems
on an equality, instead of decreasing discontent,
only served to aggravate the agitation of the old
religious jealousies.
The Revolution of 1848
Russia v/as still jealously watching
the activities in Turkey, but was forced to post-
pone her designs in that direction because of the
outbreak of the revolutions of 1848 on the continent.
The ideas, the tendencies, the principles of 1815,
disappeared with the men who had created and main-
tained them up to the crisis of 1848 all but in
Russia where the old reactionary tendencies remained
immutable. In that lay her radical error. The real
direction of repression had passed out of the hands
of Metternich into the grasp of the Emperor of
Russia. Everywhere he came to the assistance of
threatened authority, encouraging terrified monarchs
to resistance, promising to those who held fast to
the edifice of 1815, the ultimate aid of his own
servile serfs. The Imperial Cabinet stiffened itself
in its resistance to bind together the conservative
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elements which were threatened, on all sides. The
army was put on a war footing and was placed, at
the disposal of Germany and Austria.
When the revolution broke out in Hun-
gary, the Tzar’s two hundred thousand Cossacks were
sent to the aid of the Austrian Emperor, Francis
Joseph, and saved his throne a debt that was
never paid. Nicholas’ purpose in maintaining the
status quo which to Liberals and Conservatives
alike spelled the Congress of Vienna in Austria
was perfectly obvious. In spite of its imperfec-
tions, the edifice of 1815 was better suited to the
interests of Russia than the chaotic state of af-
fairs produced by a revolution; and Austria bound
to rtaly and to Germany was a less dangerous neigh-
bor than Austria freed from these ties and reduced
to her aspirations in the East.
To the European nationalists of 1848, it
was a blow to view the failure of the insurrections
of that year to free themselves from the system of
Metternich. But it was more irksome to realize
’'that the system was no longer dependent on its
founder; that in Metternich’ s old age a new cham-
pion had risen to perpetuate his work; and that
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this champion was none other than the most powerful
sovereign in Europe."^
But the revolution that had strengthened
so ominously the powerful position of Nicholas had
introduced a new figure into the family of European
rulers Louis Napoleon, President of the new Re-
public of France and destined to combat and take part
in the defeat of the invincible Russian,
In England, throughout the revolutions
of 1848, Palmerston’s sympathies were sincerely on
the side of the oppressed nationalities. His atti-
tude was definitely on the side of the constitutional
principles as opposed to absolutism. His attitude
in regard to the new government in France was to
acknowledge any rule that had in it evidences of
permanency. In this liberal stand, Palmerston
earned for himself an increased hatred on the part
of Nicholas.
The Question of Hungarian Refugees
At this point, the attention of the
European powers was again turned to the Porte.
After the collapse of the insurrection in Hungary,
Kossuth and three thousand Hungarian and Polish
1. Simpson, p.6-7.
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followers took refuge in Turkey from the vengeance
of the Austrian oppressors, aided by Russia. Russia
and Austria demanded their extradition. The Porte,
under the advice of France and England, re fused,mak-
ing the whole matter a question of dignity. The
result was a crisis which might have brought about
the war that actually occurred five years later.
The Sultan sent an army into the prin-
cipalities, ostensibly to keep peace, but really to
counterbalance the Russian army. Thereupon the Tzar
issued an ultimatum that the escape of a single
refugee would be taken as a declaration of war. The
Porte appealed to the Great Elchi who took the re-
sponsibility of advising resistance and allowed the
Sultan to understand that in the event of war, .Tur-
key would have the support of England and France.
The crisis became more pronounced when the Russian
ambassadors broke off relations with the Porte. At
this critical moment, Palmerston obtained the consent
of the cabinet to make friendly negotiations with
Austria and Prussia to persuade Nicholas not to
press the Sultan to submit to an action, which had .
been made a matter of dignity. He also procured the
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consent of the cabinet to send the English squad-
ron up the Dardanelles with orders to go to the aid
of the Sultan if he should need it. The Tzar sub-
mitted.
The crisis was soon passed. A com-
promise was effected whereby the refugees were sent
into the interior of Turkey beyond the reach of the
Austrian and Russian frontiers, and the Sultan 1 s
army v/as withdrawn from the principalities. But
further consequences can be seen. The whole inci-
dent accustomed France to the idea of relying upon
England against Russia in the East, and Russia was
confirmed in the illusion that it could depend upon
a community of action on the part of Austria.
The Establishment of the second
French Empire
The reaction that followed the Revolu-
tion of 1848 everywhere can be explained by the fact
that the revolutionists went further than conditions
permitted. France was ripe for a democratic republic
but not for socialism which the revolutionists at-
tempted to establish. Austria v/as ripe for moderate
constitutional monarchy and for limited home rule
for various races, but the revolutionists desired a
_ V-
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democrat ic republic and complete autonomy. In
Prussia and in Germany generally the middle and
working classes were not yet numerous enough to
dominate the country.
But our concern at this moment is with
Louis Napoleon and the effect upon Europe of his
coup d*etat of 1851 and of 1852 in establishing
himself first as President for ten years and later
as Emperor. Both of his acts were approved by
plebiscites. The chief reason for this approval
by the French nation was that the property owners,
bourgeois and peasant, badly frightened by the June
days, were convinced that democracy would inevitably
lead to socialism and confiscation, and they looked
to Napoleon as the strong man who would suppress
the socialists as his famous uncle had suppressed the
Jacobins. Yet another important reason was that the
name "Napoleon", the source of the new Emperor 1 s
power and his sole claim to fame, evoked memories
of grandeur and desires for dominance.
The official verdict of France in the
approbation of the coup d’etat of 1851 was hardly
more unanimous than the verdict of Europe. Austria
and Prussia immediately congratulated the President
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on his extended term of office; even Nicholas him-
self approved, believing that Louis Napoleon 1 s
present recourse to repressive measures argued a
permanent inclination to his own reactionary ideals.
But he warned Louis not to seek the title of Emperor
too.
Enghnd was the only power who hesitated
in recognizing the new position of Louis Napoleon.
Public opinion was divided. On one side commerce
was alarmed at the very idea of a rupture with
France; on the other, the name "Napoleon” together
with Louis 1 suppression of parliamentary government,
the idol of the English people, alienated the sym-
pathies of the English. Palmerston, who had been
high-handed and independent in his method of carry-
ing on business, was removed from office because of
his immediate and indiscreet approbation of Louis’
deed in an unofficial conversation with Count
Walewski, the French Ambassador. The dismissal of
Palmerston had its effect upon the Eastern Question,
for after 1851 there were many and rapid changes at
the British Foreign Office. Granville, Malmesbury,
Russell and Clarendon occupied the position within
the next two years. To these changes can be attributed
..
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the lack of clearly defined British policy in the
negotiations preceding the Crimean War.
But the revival of the French Empire
in 1852 was a far more serious challenge to Europe
as a whole than the prolongation of the presidency
in 1851. To recognize Napoleon III was by implica-
tion to recognize not only Napoleon I but also
Napoleon II, and to submit to the restoration to
the French throne of a member of the dynasty which
all the Powers were pledged by the Treaty of 1815
to resist.
The resistance, however, was not forth-
coming. The Treaty of 1815 had been maintained by
the Holy Alliance, which, as we have seen, England
had withdrawn from, and Austria and Prussia were too
weak to maintain it in its strict legality. Further,
when the coup d'etat of 1851 had been accomplished,
the opinion of the British Cabinet became modified
and Lord Granville, successor to Lord Palmerston in
the Foreign Office, made it felt that England would
resign herself to recognizing Napoleon under no mat-
ter v/hat title. In addition, England was concerned
in maintaining the neutrality of Belgium and feared
that Louis Napoleon, with just cause, might avenge
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himself against his weak neighbor who had. become
the focus of the intrigues of the French refugees.
Consequently, it seemed expedient to recognize the
Empire and assume friendly relations with it. With
the action of England in accepting the new Empire,
the weaker powers fell into line, but Russia con-
tinued in her protests.
Since the beginning of 1852, Nicholas
had protested the assumption by Louis Napoleon of
the imperial title. He wrote him a letter on Novem-
ber 30th urging him to consider the consequences "of
the false position in which he was about to place
„1himself by the number III. But it was too late;
the Legislative Assembly had already granted Louis
the title. The letter from the Tzar remained un-
answered for Louis could not salute Nicholas in the
imperial style until the Russian government had
recognized the new title.
Strictly speaking, it would have been
necessary for Russia to protest earlier, and not to
have recognized Louis as President. Once acknowledged
as such, the rest was only a question of a title about
which it was not worth while to disturb the general
1. Diplomatic Study, Vol.I, p.92.
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peace, Hence, due also to the fact that England
had already officially recognized the new empire,
Louis was able to keep his title without much diplo
matic strain.
The Tzar, therefore, presented his
tardy credentials. But in doing so, he addressed
the new Emperor as nMon cher ami" instead of the
customary salutation used by reigning monarchs,
"Sire, mon Frere". Historians have claimed that
this diplomatic insult by Nicholas was the origin
of the personal grudge entertained for him by Louis
Napoleon which culminated in the Crimean War. To
my mind, this has received undue stress; more im-
portant reasons will be presented later. 1 Yet it
appears evident that the reactionary attitude of
Nicholas caused Napoleon III to seek the company of
England in firmly establishing his position and the
prestige of the French Empire on the Continent.
V. THE CRIMEAN WAR
.
Let us consider for a moment by way of
recapitulation the situation among the Powers of
Europe on the eve of the Crimean War. France had
1. See page 47, 49.
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gone through a period of change in government, but
the new emperor was still bound by the treaties of
1815. He felt that, in keeping with the ancient
glories of his name, he must restore the prestige of
Prance which had suffered at the hands of the alli-
ances not only in 1815 but also in 1840 through the
foreign policy of Louis Philippe. Any attempt on
his part to bring glory to himself and to France in
Belgium and the Rhine frontier would antagonize Eng-
land and be fatal to French interests. Consequently
Napoleon 1 s attention became focused in the East.
England had been aware of the significance of the
Near Eastern Question to her interests for some
time and had been successful in limiting Russian
influence at the Porte by the Treaty of London in
1841. Russia still held to her designs upon the
Christian subjects at the Porte, and the control of
the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. "Pour la Russie
toute la fameuse question d’ Orient se resume dans
ces mots: de quelle autorite dependent les detroits
du Bosphore et des Dardanelles; qui en est le deten-
teur?"l She had almost attained her goal by the
Treaty of the Unkiar-Skelessi which Palmerston destroyed.
1. Goriainov ’Le Bospore et les Dardanelles ,' p.l
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Since that time Russian ambitions had by necessity
been postponed. As for the smaller countries
Austria and Prussia were still preoccupied by the
effects of the crisis of 1848-49, and Italy was not
yet to be considered. But the fundamental point at
issue, and one which is unfortunately lost sight of
in ascribing the Crimean War to Nicholas or Napoleon
or Stratford, was the future of the Ottoman Empire.
The Question of the Holy Places
The three cornered dispute between
France, Russia, and Turkey over the question of the
holy places of Jerusalem opened a breach which served
as the issue out of which the Crimean War arose. The
privileges of the Latins in the Holy Places dated
back to the Capitulations of 1740 between France and
the Porte by which the rights acquired by them were
expressly confirmed. But after the reign of Louis XV,
France was occupied internally and showed no interest
in the Holy Places until the time of Napoleon III.
The Greeks, however, were always sure of Russian aid.
When Louis Napoleon became President,
the chief of the Holy Places, the Holy Sepulchre, the
great church at Bethlehem, the grotto of the Nativity,
and the tomb of the Virgin at Gethsernane had fallen
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into the hands of the Greeks. Eingslake claims that
"stated in hare terms, the question was whether for
the purpose of passing through the building into
their Grotto, the Latin monks should have the key of
the chief door of the Church of Bethlehem, and also
one of the keys of each of the doors of the sacred
manger". 1 The quarrel between the Greeks and Latins
had been going on for some time. There can be no
doubt that it was Napoleon who "applied the match to
2
this highly inflammable material
1
'. He desired the
support of the clericals in the elections. He, there-
fore, decided to intervene in the dispute of the Holy
Places invoking the Capitulations of 1740.
.
The Porte replied that she was ready to
recognize her obligations but that subsequent events
must be taken into account. She consented, however,
to the appointment of a mixed commission composed of
Greeks and Latins to inquire into the relative claims
of each in the dispute. This concession aroused deep
resentment on the part of Nicholas who held that the
anterior secular rights of the Greeks, not to speak
of the numerous facts posterior to 1740, had established
1. Kingslake , Invasion of the Crimea, Vol.I, p.46
2. Marriott^?. 252
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their right to the possession of the Holy Places,
and concession of any kind to the Latins was -unjust.
Accordingly, the Tzar sought to intimi-
date Sultan Abdul Med j id by representing to him the
wrong he would do to himself in the face of the im-
mense majority of his subjects and by infringing a
state of tilings consecrated by time. He also inter-
vened at Paris stressing the danger of raising re-
ligious questions which in the existing state in Turkey
might have the most disastrous consequences. The
Sultan finding himself between two fires pursued the
characteristic Ottoman diplomacy. In the temporary
absence of M. de Lavalette, the French ambassador,
the Porte issued a firman on January 1852 favourable
to the Greek interests
,
granting concessions to the
Latins in minor considerations ,but practically main-
taining the status quo. But upon the return of
M. de Lavalette and under the leadership of Reschid
Pasha and Fuad Effendi, Turkish reform leaders, a
second firman was sent to France, containing no men-
tion of the pronouncement sent to Russia, but placing
the Latins at an advantage in the Holy Places.
By this time Nicholas was incensed and
the affair took on immense proportions. Not even
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Napoleon* s recall of his bellicose representative at
Constantinople would satisfy him. He mobilized fifty
thousand men on the Pruth, and dispatched to Constan-
tinople in March 1853 a special ambassador. Prince
Mensehikoff
.
Nicholas* Plans
Menschikoff was charged not only to se-
cure full satisfaction in regard to the Holy Places,
but, more important, he was to demand from the Sultan
a secret alliance whereby in exchange for the permanent
support of Russia the Sultan would grant "an addition
to the Treaty of Kainardji, whereby the Greek Church
should be placed entirely under Russian protection
„
1
without reference to Turkey . An acceptance by the
Sultan of such a proposal would have meant abdication
of sovereignity over twelve to fifteen millions of
Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire. In de-
manding these guarantees, Nicholas held that the
j
Treaty of Kainardji had given him the right to inter-
vene in any manner on behalf of the orthodox Church
2in Turkey. By Article VII of that Treaty the
Sultan promised to protect the Christian religion in
his States
. To Nicholas these vague terms implied
1. Lane Poole, Vol.II, p.248.
2, See page 7.
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that Russia had the right to see to the protection
of not only the Russian subjects residing in Turkey,
but also all the orthodox subjects of the Sultan.
He insisted that some further guarantee was necessary
in order to validate the famous treaty of 1774.
The Tzar counted on the neutrality of Aus-
tria, whom he had aided in the crisis of 1848-49,
and Prussia. In regard to England, the Tzar felt
assured of friendly action, basing his belief on the
impression he had received during his visit to St.
James in 1844, and on the theory that with Palmerston’s
fall from office he had nothing to fear from Aberdeen.
Hence in January 1853, he had a series of interviews
with Sir Hamilton Seymour, British ambassador at St.
Petersburg. He claimed that the demise of the sick
man was close at hand and attempted once more to
draw England into an agreement whereby a partition
could be effected. The European territories of the
Porte could be formed into independent states, and
British interests could be safeguarded by the occu-
pation of Egypt and Crete. For herself, Russia would
insist that no great power should be installed at
Constantinople; she would support the status quo as
long as possible, but she would not allow a pistol
'.
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to be fired for the reconstruction of the Turkish
power. The British Government politely declined
these overtures, declaring that ’’nothing is more
calculated to precipitate a Turkish catastrophe
than the constant prediction of its being close at
hand " .
^
In spite of this rejection by the
British Government, it seems certain that until the
war broke out, Nicholas was still under the impression
that England was not opposed to the destruction of
the Ottoman Empire. He counted on Lord Aberdeen’s
Pfriendship and sympathy with his ideas. “That
they were refused”, says Marriott; "was due largely
to the mistrust inspired among the ministers by the
Treaty of Unkiar -Skelessi, much more to the popular
detestation of Russia aroused by her treatment of
the Poles, and most of all to the part played by the
Tzar in the suppression of the Hungarian insurrection
in 1849”.^ Palmerston, who had taken the Home
Office in Aberdeen’s Cabinet 1852 and whose influence
in the Cabinet was great, foresaw that the Tzar would
use the result of the trouble over the Holy Places
for his own advantage later. In a letter to Clarendon,
1. Clarendon to Seymour 3/23/53 Annual Register 1853, p.258.
2. Diplomatic Study, p.158.
3. Marriott; p.259.
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May 22,1853, Palmerston wrote, ’’the Russian Govern-
ment has always had two strings to its bow
moderate language and disinterested professions at
Petersburg and at London; active aggressions by its
agents on the scene of operations. If the aggressions
succeed locally, the Petersburg Government adapts
them as a ’fait accompli’ which it did not intend,
but cannot, in honour, recede from. If the local
agents fail, they are disavowed and recalled, and
the language previously held is appealed to as a
proof that the agents have overstepped their in-
structions . There are,no doubt , evidences of truth
in this criticism. The Tzar frequently professed
his intention to respect the integrity of the Otto-
man Empire, but he was clearly formulating plans for
its partition and disposition.
It will be remembered that a part of
Menschikoff ’ s mission the proposed Russian Alli-
ance with Turkey, involving the Christian subjects
of the Porte had been kept a secret. Although
Stratford and Palmerston had penetrated the Tzar’s
designs, the Cabinet at London was asleep and re-
mained so for eight weeks because Baron Brunnow,
1. Ashley, Life of Palmerston, Vol.II, p.273.
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Russian representative at London, by the simple ex-
pedient of omitting part of Menschikoff ' s instruc-
tions, passed over in silence the proposed alliance,
expressing only the desire of Russia to obtain
"guarantees for the future" and at the same time a
"reparation for the past" in connection with the
preservation of the status quo of the Orthodox
Church in the East. Even the Russian Official
Publication admitted this reserve as very grave,
^
for it alienated the so far neutral attitude of the
British Cabinet, and together with the publication
of the Tzar’s proposal to Seymour aroused the Eng-
lish public opinion against the Tzar to a fever
pitch.
Stratford vs. Menschikoff
On no account did the quarrel about
the Holy Places require either the mobilization of
the Russian army on the Pruth or the display of pomp
and ceremony which marked the arrival of Menschikoff
at Constantinople. The rough and overbearing ambas-
sador arrived at the Porte accompanied by a large
military retinue, after having quite ostentatiously
viewed the Russian naval and military forces in the
Black Sea. He refused to pay the customary visits
1. Diplomatic Study, p.163.
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of courtesy to the Turkish foreign minister, Fuad
Effendi of the Reform Party, and with studied inso-
lence demanded and procured from the Sultan the
resignation of his minister. The Turkish capital
was in an uproar.
It so happened that neither the English
nor the French ambassador was present at Constanti-
nople. Colonel Rose, the English charge d’affaires,
on the grounds that Russia was making her troops
advance towards Turkish territory and was ordering
large supplies of provisions in the Principalities,
without having yet presented her demands to the Porte
took it upon himself to summon Admiral Dundas, com-
manding the English squadron at Malta, to the Bay of
Vour la. Because of the ignorance in which the British
Government still remained as to the true instructions
given to Prince Menschikoff, this order was promptly
countermanded by Lord Clarendon, Minister of Foreign
Affairs. But the effect of Rose’s action on the
Porte is important. It revealed the British hand to
the Turks and they shrewdly took advantage of it.
But without waiting to hear whether the
step taken by the British charge d’affaires were rati
fied or disapproved, the Emperor Napoleon dispatched
..
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a French fleet to the Bay of Salami s . He did not
wish to allow England the sole honour of defending
Turkey and sought possibly to force her hand. At
any rate, the isolated action of France made it evi-
dent to the Tzar that it was hardly possible that
France and England would unite against him. But,
he was soon disillusioned, for at this moment,
Stratford de Redcliffe, armed with a somewhat vague
authority to order Admiral Dundas to hold his fleet
in readiness to sail for the near East, arrived at
Constantinople. Stratford was a notorious opponent
and firm personal adversary of Nicholas.
(In 1832, the Tzar had refused to ac-
cept Stratford whom Palmerston had appointed Ambas-
l
sador to Russia; and Stratford had refused to relieve
the tension by resigning, hence forcing the Tzar to
content himself for two years with a mere charge
d’affaires. Certainly there was no personal affec-
tion between the two.)
"Stratford Canning was the last and
with all his faults the greatest of that genera-
tion of English ambassadors to whom greatness was
permitted. His personal influence at the Porte we
1. Simpson, p.225.
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have seen in his management of affairs at the
Treaty of Bucharest His experience at the Porte
and. his own dauntless energy enabled him to dominate
the entire situation which he found awaiting him at
Constantinople. Kingslake expresses his part in
this critical state of affairs thus: "The power to
choose between peace and war went out of the courts
of Paris and London and passed to Constantinople.
Lord Stratford was worthy of this trust, for being
firm and supplied with full knowledge, and having
power by his own mere ascendency to enforce modera-
tion upon the Turks and to forbid panic, even to
keep down tumult, he was able to be very chary in
the display of force, and to be more frugal than the
government at home in using or engaging the pov/er of
the English Queen. Entrusted with the chief
prerogative of kings, and living all his time at
Therapia, close over the gates of the Bosphorus, he
seemed to stand guard against the North, and to an-
swer for the safety of his charge."^
Stratford arrived at the Porte on
April 5,1853. He had learned the future courses of
both the governments at Paris and Vienna, having
1. See p.15,16.
2. Kingslake Vol.I, p.182-190.
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visited at those places on Ills way to Constantinople.
The crude Russian envoy was no match for the shrewd
English ambassador who toyed with Menschikoff, affec-
know
ting to/nothing of Russia’s real aims, and adopted
immediately an ingenious line of tactics. He sepa-
rated completely the local question of the Holy
Places from that of the general guarantees claimed
by the Tzar. Accordingly the affair of the Holy
Places was soon regulated in a satisfactory manner,
April 22,1853.
To allow this separation of questions
was a fatal error to Menschikoff. He had accomplished
the professed object of his mission and forced him-
self to place his country in an unfavorable light by
producing openly the demand for the Protectorate which
had been disavowed by the Tzar, at London particularly.
Nevertheless the Russian demand in an ultimatum ad-
dressed to the Porte on May 5th was forced upon the
Sultan, who, upon the advice of Stratford, rejected
it. On May 21st, Menschikoff, with the whole diplo-
matic staff of Russia, left Constantinople.
The discomfiture of his minister aroused
Nicholas to frenzy. After three months of fruitless
negotiations, the guarantees which he had demanded
were refused by the Porte at the instigation of the
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Western Representatives. Such a serious check to
the political position of Russia in the East was
more than the extreme irritation of the Tzar could
stand. In merely breaking diplomatic relations, the
question would still be left open. Hence Nicholas
decided on a display of force. He issued an ultima-
tum to the Porte, demanding the acceptance of Prince
Menschikoff ’ s claims within eight days. In case of
a refusal, Russian troops would occupy the princi-
palities; not to make war upon the Sultan, but to
take possession, temporarily, of a material guarantee
until satisfaction should be given to the Russian
demands
.
The Tzar then communicated his demands
to the Western Powers, protesting that his act was
prompted by motives entirely pacific. He hoped to
restrain the Western Powers from demonstrations which,
by encouraging the Turks in their resistance, might
place Russia in an awkward position. Further, he
desired to make sure of the assistance of his Aus-
trian ally.
The English Foreign Office
Meanwhile when the news, communicated
by Stratford, reached London, that Russia aimed at
-.
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a protectorate over the Orthodox populations of
Turkey, which would affect the independence and
integrity of the Ottoman Empire, the emotions of
the whole country were aroused. Aberdeen* s cabinet,
formed in 18o2 and consisting of six Whigs, six
f
Peelites and one Radical,was too brilliant to work
together smoothly. Aberdeen, as premier, was working
for peace, hoping to exert a moral influence over
Russia but at the same time not wishing to doubt the
pacific intentions of the Tzar. Palmerston, on the
other hand, was all for action which he believed was
the only way to avert war. Lord John Russell was in
accord with Palmerston. Eetween these two extremes
*
Clarendon had the double task of keeping peace be-
tween Russia and Turkey and of harmonizing the di-
vergent policies of his colleagues. Nevertheless,
the pressure of the v/ar party grew. Clarendon at-
tached much importance to the cooperation of France
and on the eve of the occupation of the Principali-
ties v/as willing to join with Napoleon in taking
naval measures against the Tzar. Any effect that
such measures might have had v/as destroyed by Aber-
deen who failed to make the Tzar realize that the
occupation of the Principalities would be deeply
..
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re sent ed. by the English people. The prime minister
still believed that the Tzar would make concessions
and that the Turks would take every advantage of the
assistance of the Western Powers. Hence, at the in-
sistence of Aberdeen, the British Government advised
the Porte not to consider Russia’s action as a cause
of war. Accordingly, Brunnow, deceived or deceiving,
did not reveal the real British feeling to the Tzar.
It will be remembered the Emperor Na-
poleon had already sent his fleet to Salamis. In
countermanding the order of Colonel Rose in regard
to the British fleet at Malta in the early stage of
the negotiations Aberdeen had placed himself at
a disadvantage in the public opinion of his country-
men. But when the Russian ultimatum was made known,
it became necessary for positive action to be taken
in order to satisfy that public opinion and, more
important, to effect a compromise between the two
factions in the Cabinet. On May 31,1853, the British
fleet was ordered to join the French fleet at Besika
Bay at the entrance to the Dardanelles. By this for-
ward step the British Government committed itself
more than it realized. Such a move was bound to in-
fluence the Turks to resist the Russian ultimatum.
1. See p.56
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It also resulted in the Russian claim that her sub-
sequent occupation of the Principalities on June 21,
1853 was necessitated by the advance of the Western
fleets which is untrue, since her threat to do
that very thing had been made known to the Pov/ers
as well as to the Sultan. But Palmerston believed
that the only chance of now convincing Russia that
England was in earnest and thus averting war . would
be to order them up to the Bosphorus and even into
the Black Sea. Aberdeen, however, insisted on the
half measure, and on the adherence to the principles
laid down in the Treaty of 1840, which would not be
violated by locating the ships outside the Dardanelles.
On the other hand, in case of an attack upon Constan-
tinople by the Russians, the fleets would be too far
away to help immediately. Perhaps a demonstration
as Palmerston demanded would have staid the hand of
the Russian Tzar,
The Occupation of the Principalities
Nevertheless, Prince Gortschakoff and
thirty-five thousand Russian troops crossed the
Pruth and occupied the Principalities on June 22,
1853 the immediate cause of the Crimean War,
According to the common interpretation of inter-
national law, an act of war against Turkey had been
committed
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The Vienna Note
The advance of the English fleet to
join the French at Besika Bay showed Nicholas that
the alliance between the two Western Powers, which
he had thought was impossible was almost accomplished.
But more significant, the Tzar v/as impressed at the
unexpected violence of Austria’s opposition to his
occupation of the Principalities. Accordingly, he
accepted the invitation of Count Buol, the Austrian
Chancellor, to submit the question to the arbitra-
tion of the representatives of Austria, Prussia,
France and England. Austria was anxious to avert
war, fearing that the establishment of Russia in the
Principalities would be a dangerous influence on her
own Slav subjects. Her interests were, of course,
Prussia’s. England held to her old policy that the
problem of the Near .East was one for the Powers in
Concert. And France could not be left alone hostile
to Russia. The conference met in Vienna in July
1853, the result of which was the famous Vienna Note.
It is interesting to suppose the result
had Turkey accepted Menschikoff 1 s note and agreed to
grant Russia, in terms which were vague and debatable,
the right to intervene in the quarrels of the Greek
Christians and the Ottoman Turks, which in fact she
".
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had been doing right along. Perhaps this was the
intention of the diplomats of the Pour Powers, but
at any rate the Note to which they unanimously agreed
showed their obtuseness and insincerity by vaguely
re-affirming the previous treaties.
In accordance with the Note, the Porte
was to declare: "If at all times the Emperors of
Russia have shown their active solicitude for the
maintenance of the immunities and privileges of the
Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Empire, the
Sultans have never refused to affirm them anew by
solemn acts which attested their ancient and constant
benevolence towards their Christian subjects
the government of His Majesty the Sultan will remain
faithful to the letter and spirit of the stipulations
of the Treaties of Kainardji and of Adrianople rela-
tive to the protecting of the Christian worship, and
that His Majesty regards it as a point of honour with
him to cause to be preserved forever from all attacks
either at presfent or in future, the enjoyment of the
spiritual privileges which have been accorded by the
august ancestors of His Majesty to the Orthodox Church
in the East, and which are maintained and confirmed by
him; and moreover, to allow the Greek worship to
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part icipate in a spirit of high justice in the advan-
tages conceded to other Christians by convention or
special agreement.""'’
Immediately upon receiving it, Russia
accepted it. But to the common amazement, this Note,
drawn up by the friends of Turkey and accepted by the
uncompromising Nicholas, was refused by Turkey.
It so happened that the Note had been
hurriedly drafted and in England Clarendon had serious-
ly erred in agreeing to it without first being assured
that the Porte would accept it as it stood: He in-
structed Stratford to accept it if no other arrange-
2
ments had been made. If there had been a telegraph
perhaps there might not have been a war; at any rate,
the dispute about its interpretation would not have
arisen. The Vienna Conference might have reconsidered
its Note in the light of the proposals that Stratford
was in the process of formulating. Clarendon would
not have placed his ambassador and his country in
such an embarrassing position. Even the Tzar, who
had accepted the Vienna Note as an ultimatum probably
would have accepted one that had been drafted more
carefully. But once having committed himself he in
honour could take no backward steps.
1. Annual Register 1853, p.278.
2. Lane-Poole
,
Vol.II, p.290-291.
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Stratford Canning could not avoid carry-
ing out the instructions of his home office to support
the Vienna Note. Hence as ambassador he recommended
them officially, but as a man he gave his personal
opinion which was to reject the Note on the grounds
that by its very ambiguities it granted to Russia the
claims that Turkey had all along denied. This double
interpretation of Stratford’s was one of the high-
lights of the negotiations.
The Porte then proposed three amendments:
first, "the maintenance of the immunities and privi-
leges of the Orthodox Greek Church in the Ottoman Em-
pire” was declared to depend, not upon the "active
solicitude” of the Emperors of Russia, but upon the
Sultans. Secondly, the Sultan would "remain faithful
to the stipulations of the Treaty of Kainardji, con-
firmed by that of Adrianople, relative to the protec-
tion b; 7 the Sublime Porte of the Christian religion.”
And thirdly, the Greek Church was to share only in
the advantages granted to the other Christians, "being
„
1
Ottoman subjects
.
The first impression caused by this an-
swer of the Turkish Government was most unfavorable.
The Vienna Conference accused the Porte of compromising
1. Annual Register 1853, p.280.
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the general interests of Europe by her obstinacy in
insisting upon seemingly trivial modifications. But
though verbally slight, the proposed amendments were
not trivial. The most important was the addition of
the words "by the Sublime Porte", which revealed the
whole question at issue between Russia and Turkey.
Since, however, the alterations in the
Note merely served to render explicit the loosely
worded intentions of its authors, England now urged
the acceptance of the revised version upon the Tzar.
But Nicholas refused, as derogatory to the dignity
of Russia, to accept the Turkish amendments to the
to
Note/which he had already given his formal assent.
So an effort was made to assure the Porte that no
new rights were given to the Tzar by the Note, that
the Treaty of Kainardji did not involve the immuni-
ties and privileges of the Greek Church; and that the
Note could not be construed to mean the extending of
privileges to several millions of subjects that had
at various times been granted to foreigners. But
Stratford, taking upon himself great responsibility
and contrary to the wishes of the Four Powers, his
own country included, encouraged the Sultan to insist
upon the amendments.
.,
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Stratford was right, for at this point
the Tzar proceeded to throw away all the advantage
which he had gained by his prompt acceptance of the
Vienna Note by explaining his reasons for accepting
it.
In a dispatch of Nesselrode to Count
Meydendoff, Russian Ambassador at Vienna, the Russian
Chancellor revealed a reasoned analysis of Turkey’s
proposed modifications and Russia’s grounds for re-
jecting them. The dispatch pointed out three advan-
tages in the Vienna Note. (1) It recognized "that
there has ever existed on the part of Russia active
solicitude for her co-religionists in Turkey, as
also for the maintenance of their religious immuni-
ties, and that the Ottoman government is disposed to
take account of that solicitude, and also to leave
those immunities untouched". (2) Its "terms, which
made the maintenance of the immunities to be derived
from the very spirit of the treaty (of Kainardji)
were in conformity with the doctrine which we main-
tained and still maintain. For the promise to
protect a religion and its churches implies of necess-
ity the maintenance of the immunities enjoyed by
them". (3) Russia could claim for the Greek Church
.'
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privileges similar to those enjoyed by the Latins
under treaties between the Porte and Catholic govern-
ments. The Russian government professed satisfaction
with the vague implications of the original Vienna
Note and the Treaty of Kainardji since they enabled
it to interpret them in accord with its own views.
This document was intended for the Aus-
trian Emperor alone in order to make known the motives
which led Russia to decline the Porte’s amendments
to the original Note. But quite mysteriously it was
published on September 7th by a Berlin newspaper and
the European press, which for the most part was hos-
tile to Russia, stirred public opinion against the
evident aggrandizement policy of the great Slavic
nation.
In the face of the antagonism that the
Russian interpretation had called forth, Nicholas felt
it necessary to allay these suspicions by conferring
• i
v/ith the Austrian Emperor, Francis Joseph, at Olmutz.
In that interview, the Tzar insisted that he asked
for nothing which could prejudice the independence
or rights of the Sultan or which would imply a desire
to interfere v/ith the internal affairs of the Porte,
1. See Diplomatic Study for entire document, Vol.I,
p.214-217
.
..
.
.
*
.
-71-
and that he desired only the maintenance of the status
quo; but nevertheless stood by the Vienna Note without
repudiating the interpretation given by Nesselrode. Not
withstanding, at the conference at Olmutz, the Austrian
Emperor vms impressed by the pacific explanations of
the Tzar. The London publication, "Punch", depicts
NicholasI and Francis Joseph seated at a table, a
bottle between them. "Let us finish the Port(e)", urged
Nicholas.*^ The question was at a deadlock.
England and France declared that the
Russian interpretation of the Vienna Note revealed
the fact that Russia had read into the ambiguities
of the original Note concessions not intended by its
framers. Consequently, they refused to follow Aus-
tria and Prussia in urging the Porte to accept the
original Note.
But Turkey at this time was growing out
of hand. The finances of the Sultan's government
were becoming exhausted by the expenses of the
mobilization, commerce was paralyzed, and anxiety,
universal. Moreover the long delay of the negotia-
tions was irksome to the impetuous Turk. At the be-
ginning of October, the Porte, confident that Great
Britain and France would not leave her to the mercy
of Russia, sent an ultimatum to Prince Gortschakoff
1. "Mr. Punch" Victorian Era, Vol.I, p.163.
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demanding the evacuation of the Principalities
within fifteen days; if this were not done, hostili-
ties would begin at once. On October 25,1853, Turkey
declared war.
It happened that on October 22nd, at the
instance of the French Government, the English and
French fleets had passed into the Dardanelles, in
the event of a Russian attack upon Constantinople,
The Diplomatic Study"*" states that this forward move
not only encouraged the Porte to break all bounds by
declaring war, but also was a flagrant infringement
2
of the Treaty of the Straits. However, Simpson states
that on October 10th Russia had replied to the Turkish
ultimatum with a virtual refusal and that thereupon
a state of war existed between the two empires.
Although the fleets of the Western
Powers were in readiness in the event of a Russian
attack upon Constantinople, hopes of a pacific issue
were not dead. The Tzar announced that his troops
would maintain a defensive attitude unless it became
necessary to assume aggressive tactics; but that Rus-
sia would continue to occupy the Principalities as
a guarantee until the Porte accepted her claims,
1. Diplomatic Study, p.222.
2, Simpson, p.237.
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Attempts then were being made by the Powers in Con-
cert to frame a new Note. Before any definite action
could be taken, the Turkish army early in November
crossed the Danube and defeated the Russians at
Oltenitza in the first pitched battle of the war.
Sinope
The anger of the Tzar knew no bounds.
On November 30th the Turkish squadron on its way from
the Bosphorus to Batoum was entirely destroyed by the
Russian fleet in the Bay of Sinope.
In the meantime, the diplomacy of the
Powers had been attempting since October to find a
formula to restore the peace between Turkey and Rus-
sia, and a second Vienna protocol signed on December
5th established an identity of views among the Four
Powers, on the basis of which the Porte was asked to
state its terms. By the second Vienna Note it was
held that there were two conditions necessary to the
European equilibrium: (1) the integrity of the Otto-
man Empire; and (2) governmental independence of the
Sultan. But the Sultan was to be asked to ameliorate
the condition of his subjects.
But the efforts of the ambassadors were made futile
by the force of circumstance. It was at once obvious that
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Sinope and its immediate consequences had immediately
increased the probability of a European war. When
the news of the catastrophe reached the western capi-
tals two weeks later, it was calmly received in Paris,
^
but in England it aroused immense indignation. Prom
this time on, it became evident that war was inevit-
able. Even so, Aberdeen ! s peace cabinet tried to
stem the tide of public opinion to no avail. The
Russian attack was looked upon as a breach of the
Tzar’s promise to refrain from taking the offensive;
the continuance of the Russian cannonade long after
the Turkish crews were completely defenseless, so
that four thousand of them were killed, caused the
Turk to be considered an abused and plucky fellow
whom England should aid; but, most of all the action
of the Russian fleet in destroying the Turkish ships,
practically in the presence of the western squadrons
was too severe a strain for English honour. The pub-
lic clamored for war.
The whole of the machinery of the English
government, however, was opposed to v/ar: the Foreign
Office, the Premier, the ’’Times”
,
the Queen, and the
Prince Consort himself. The "Times", the official
conservative paper, along with Aberdeen, Victoria,
1. Diplomatic Study, p.280.
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and Albert, hated the Turk, feared Napoleon III,
as it had the first of his dynasty, and was against
Palmerston. The "Chronicle" also supported Aberdeen.
But the Radical papers raved for v/ar, especially the
"Morning Advertiser", Palmerston's organ, which had
been bellicose from the beginning.
The tide of public opinion was not to
be stemmed, however. Russia was obnoxious to the
average Englishman because of its tremendous size
,
stretching over parts of three continents, and because
of its oppressive measures. Kossuth, on his visit to
England, had impressed the Liberals with the idea that
there could be no freedom in the world until Russia
was vanquished. One by one the opponents of the v/ar.
fell into line. Soon the "Times" instead of leading
public opinion, was led and gradually took up the cry
for war.
In the cabinet, the schism caused further
difficulty. Palmerston, not wishing to identify him-
self with a cabinet which public opinion had condemned,
and opposed to the continued pacific measures of his
colleagues after Sinope, resolved to resign. In ac-
cordance with the English usage, which does not permit
of a change of Ministry on the question of foreign
,
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policy
,
he chose as a pretext, his disagreement on
the Electoral Bill, and resigned. To the English
public it appeared that he had been forced to resign
at the insistence of the pro Russian Queen and her
consort, and the stability of the crov/n was endangered.
Within a few days, the Cabinet was obliged to beg him
back on his own terms, even' though those terms meant
war. It is curious, however, that the special act
which provoked the declaration of war -— the sending
of the allied fleets to take possession of the Black
Sea was ordered by the cabinet during the interval
of Palmerston’s resignation.
„
In France, the state of affairs was quite
the reverse. The people of England demanded war, but
in France, the people wanted peace. After long years
of discontent, the French people had obtained the
government they desired, and wanted peace above all
things. It was also distasteful to them that in this
particular war, France’s ally was the victor of Waterloo.
Further, after Moscow of 1812 Russia was considered in-
vincible. "It was a testimony to the immense hold
which he had on French public opinion that the Emperor
should have succeeded in rallying it to such an adven-
ture in such company at all."l
1. Simpson, p.243.
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Unfortunately
,
the French Emperor de-
sired to do something showy with the fleets. Ac-
cordingly, the French Ambassador, Count Walewski,
proposed at London an arrangement to furnish the
admirals with definite instructions whereby the al-
lied squadrons would enter the Black Sea and command
all Russian ships to return to Sebastopol. The
presence of the Western squadrons in the Black Sea
would not only prevent a reoccurrence of Sinope, but
also would serve as a guarantee to offset the occu-
pation of the Principalities. Under the pressure of
Palmerston’s resignation and the popular indignation
it aroused, the British Cabinet accepted the proposal,
and by January 4th the Black Sea was emptied of
Russian shipping.
The Answer of the Porte to the Second^
Vienna Note
In the meantime, on December 50th the
Porte had replied to the Second Vienna Note with
these terms on which it would make peace: (1) the
territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire; (2)
the evacuation of the Principalities; (3) the re-
newal of guarantees given to the Porte in 1841;
(4) respect for governmental independence of the
Sultan. It will be noticed that this answer was
(
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substantially a repetition of its original offer to
Russia. Nevertheless the Vienna Conference accepted
it and communicated it to St . Petersburg.
Unfortunately, the new Note reached St,
Petersburg on the same day that Nicholas heard of the
entrance of the Western fleets into the Black Sea,
He had watched with mounting irritation the advance
of the allied squadrons to Besika Bay, through the
Dardanelles, and now the last step the Black Sea.
Readily would he have declared war on France and Eng-
land, but he was not sure of his position.
Hence, the Tzar wanted to gain time. It
was important for him to come to a definite under-
standing as to Russia’s relations towards the two
German Courts in the approaching crisis. For this
reason. Count Orloff was commissioned to carry his
proposals to Vienna, and Baron Budberg, to Berlin.
By these proposals, the Tzar declared that Russia
would by herself sustain the struggle against the
two naval powers, and recommended their adoption of
a strict neutrality as the attitude best suited to
the interests of Austria and Germany. In defining
this neutrality, the Emperor proposed to them an
agreement containing the following stipulations:^"
1, Diplomatic Study, p.238.
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(1) the two German Courts should remain neutral, and
should repel if necessary, by arms, any attack in-
tended to force them out of their neutrality. (2)
In case of aggression upon the territory of the Con-
federation, Russia and her two allies would look upon
such an act as if it were committed against their own
territory. (3) If the war should bring about any
change in the status of the Ottoman Empire, Russia
undertook to conclude no agreement with the maritime
powers, without coming to a previous understanding
with her allies.
The efforts of the ministers at Vienna
and Berlin, however, were unsuccessful. The Berlin
Cabinet refused to engage itself in such a positive
manner to neutrality, but King Frederick William de-
clared that he would never permit himself to be drawn
into war against Russia, He explained, although he
did not disavow the principle of the Protocol of
December 5th, that his participation had been simply
for pacific reasons. In Vienna, the Cabinet definitely
refused to bind itself to neutrality. It feared the
French menaces in Italy, and also the dangers of Rus-
sian influence in the Principalities. It gave the
Tzar "to understand that in such a case the Emperor
iG
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Franc is Joseph reserved to himself the right of
taking into account nothing but the interests of his
Empire
.
Having failed in these negotiations
,
Nicholas sent his ansy/er to the demands of the Porte
the
in/Vienna Protocol of December 5th. His counter-
proposals included a confirmation of the previous
treaties since that of Kainardji, relating to the
Principalities and Serbia; and a demand for a sepa-
rate document defining the old and recent firmans
relating to the religious liberty and immunities of
the Orthodox Church. The Vienna Conference rejected
these on the grounds that such demands would destroy
the equilibrium of Europe, as agreed upon by the
Powers in Concert.
The French Emperor then took it upon
himself to take pacific measures. Undoubtedly, the
attitude of the French public led him to attempt to
play the important role of peacemaker thus consolidat-
ing his political position at home and abroad. On
January 29th in an autograph letter to Nicholas,
Napoleon proposed that hostilities should cease, the
Russian armies withdraw from the Principalities and
the allied squadrons, from the Black Sea, and that
1. Diplomatic Study, p.242.
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Russia negotiate directly with Turkey a convention
which would be submitted to the Vienna Conference
for final ratification. These proposals, concilia-
tory in themselves, were accompanied by a purposely
plain-spoken intimation that their rejection would
force France and England to declare war. "The chief
criticisms to which Louis’ overture exposed him at
the time were that it savoured of self-advertisement;
that in seeking peace in this outrageously public
manner he was departing from all the decent usages
of diplomacy; that his action was theatrical, and
displayed moreover a desire for a lion’s share of
the limelight. These criticisms are probably just."'*'
Meanwhile, when the allied fleets had
cleared the Black Sea of the Russian flag, the Rus-
sian government had instructed its representatives
in Paris and London to demand the neutrality of the
Black Sea, protecting thereby from attack Russian
ports, no less than Turkish. Such a naval armistice
would be acceptable to the Tzar, who would, neverthe-
less, reserve his freedom of action on land. In case
df a refusal to this demand by the We stern Powers,
the Russian Ambassadors were instructed to break off
diplomatic relations.
1. Simpson, p.245-246
.-
'
•
.
'
1
.
.
.
-82-
The allies in reply refused to forbid
the Turks free passage between Turkish ports, claim-
ing that the only equivalent for a naval armistice
in the Black Sea would be a military armistice in
the Principalities.
This answer, together with Napoleon’s
autograph letter which had arrived at practically
the same moment, proved too much for the temper and
dignity of the proud Nicholas. In reply to Napoleon
the Tzar scornfully rejected the offer, adding the
taunt that "Russia would prove herself in 1854 what
she was in 1812."^ And upon the notification of the
naval powers, at the beginning of February the Tzar
withdrew his ambassadors from London and Paris. He
did not declare war however.
The Ultimatum of the Western Powers
England and France now wanted to secure
the support of Austria and Prussia and hence form a
quadruple alliance against the Tzar. On February
22nd Austria, the great Pov/er most immediately con-
cerned by the Russian occupation of the Principalities,
volunteered to support the Western Powers in demanding
the evacuation of them. On the strength of this sug-
gestion, on February 27th, France and England through
1. Annual Register, p.246, 1854
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Lord Clarendon informed Count Nesselrode in an
must
ultimatum that the Russian Troops/completely evacuate
the Provinces of Moldavia and Wallachia by the 30th
of April. Russian refusal or silence would be taken
as a declaration of war.
Lord Clarendon was somewhat precipitous,,
hoy/ever, in allowing the ultimatum to be delivered
before securing a definite understanding with Austria
that military assistance would be given by her in the
event of Russia’s refusal. When, therefore, the Tzar
on March 19th informed the Western Powers that the
demand was one to which he could return no answer,
it became evident that Austria had given only diplo-
matic approval to the ultimatum. Prussia followed
Austria’s lead. The indignation of France and Eng-
land was immense. The probable explanation of Aus-
tria’s apparent trickery is that Prussia, unwilling
to break with Russia because of the personal
relationship between the two rulers and the pro -
Russian attitude of the German Diet refused to
join with Austria, and the latter, knowing that the
best corps of the Russian army was being kept in
Poland, declined the chances of a contest v/hich would
certainly encourage the Italian states to rise against
her
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The Concert of Europe, which would have
compelled Russia to yield, was broken; and the Wes-
tern Powers were compelled without the support of
the German Courts to declare war, March 27th and
28th, 1854.
vn. conclusion
Summary
The presence of the alien Turk in
Europe and the future of his Empire here presented
the ccmplicated problem, the Eastern Question, which
has baffled European Powers for centuries. We have
seen the condition of his Empire in the eighteenth
century in the political decay and disintegration,
and the injustice done to Christians , their lives and
property. Prom this time it was evident that the
merely
problem of the Near East concerned, not/the Balkan
races, but the Powers of Europe, Russia in particular.
Prom the days of Peter the Great, Europe
had recognized the interest of Russia in the East.
The great Slavic nation was pushing her way southward,
and by 1774, with the Treaty of Kutschuk-Kainardii,
was not only firmly encamped upon the Black Sea, but
also, and of more significance later, had procured
-.
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from the Sultan a promise to protect the Christian
religion and its churches. For this vague claim to
guardianship of the Orthodox subjects of the Porte,
Russia, in 1852, proposed to substitute a definite
right of intervention. Additional gains of Russia
were made by the Treaties of Jassy, 1792, and Bucharest,
1812, by which Russia received the Crimea, the recogni-
tion of religious influence in the Principalities , and
Bessarabia.
It is during this period that new factors
enter into the problem. Napoleon, in his acquisition
of the Ionian Isles, his grandiose schemes for an at-
tack on British India, through Egypt, his colorful
agreement with Alexander at Tilsit for the partition
of the Ottoman Empire, definitely opened the eyes
not only of the French but also of the English. The
personal prestige of Sir Stratford Canning gained by
him in his extraordinary activity in bringing about
the Treaty of Bucharest in 1812, and the influence
that England henceforth was able to exert at the Porte,
also lend significance to this period.
The struggle for Greek Independence, for
the first time really focused the attention of the
English Cabinet as well as the English people on the
..
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developments in South Eastern Europe. Hence-
forward, the Eastern Question was recognized, not
merely as the bone of contention between the Sultan
and the Tzar but, by the awakened interest of England,
as an international problem. George Canning, fearing
that Tzar Alexander would take advantage of the in-
surrection in Greece to gain his own ends, attempted
to secure an understanding with Russia, to join with
her and Prance in settling the revolt, and to induce
the Sultan to come to terms with his insurgent sub-
jects. His untimely death, and the unwise actions
of Wellington, destroyed the Concert of Europe. Both
Stratford and Palmerston urged that Russia not be al-
lowed to act alone in coercing the Porte, but nothing
was done and England lost all that she had gained.
Russia then was left alone to deal with the Turk and
by the Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 secured protection
of the Principalities and free navigation of the Black
Sea. England was able to exert a decisive influence,
however, and by the Treaty of London, Greece was es-
tablished as an independent nation under the protec-
tion of the Powers. Two important results may be
noted: (1) the distrust and antagonism on the part
of the European Powers toward the increased influence
..
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of Russia at the Porte, and (2) the significance of
the assistance granted to the Sultan by his vassal,
Mehemet Ali, during the insurrection.
In the decade following 1830-1841
the European Powers v/ere concerned with the rebellions
of Mehemet Ali. With the attempt of this powerful
vassal to gain independent rule in Egypt, the Sultan
was forced to appeal to the Powers. Only Russia was
disposed to aid him and in return exacted the Treaty
of TJnkiar-Skelessi which practically placed Turkey
under the protection of the Tzar. Among the Western
Powers, and in England, especially, great indignation
and distrust were aroused by this last advance of
Russia. Palmerston protested in vain at Constanti-
nople and at St . Petersburg; but his eyes were open
to the aggrandizing polic:/ of Russia and her hostile
opportunity the Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi should be
torn up.
That opportunity came with the second
revolt of Mehemet Ali in 1839. Because of the aliena-
tion with France over the Egyptian question, England
through the negotiations of Palmerston joined with
Russia in aiding the Sultan. Russia was eager for
influence in Europe that at the first
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the alliance because of her desire to break up the
former cordial understanding between England and
France. By the quadrilateral treaty of 1840, Eng-
land, Russia, Austria, and Prussia agreed with the
Porte to drive back the Egyptians and pacify the
Levant. France was isolated and the probability of
war, imminent. But the crisis soon passed, due to
the firmness of Palmerston and the pacific disposition
of the new French minister Guizot. By the Treaty of
London, 1841, the Egyptian question was settled, the
straits closed to ships of war of every nation, and .
Turkey was placed under the protection of the Powers.
The Treaty of Unkiar-Skelessi was wiped out, and by
treaty agreement the exclusive protectorate over
Turkey was destroyed. After 1841 Russia never suc-
cessfully reasserted her claims.
After the success of Palmerston’s
strong foreign policy, Nicholas was convinced that
the attainment of Russian interests at the Porte
could only be achieved in alliance v/ith England.
He made two attempts to come to terms with Great
Britain, one at the Court of St. James in 1844, and
one on the eve of the Crimean War with Sir. Hamilton
Seymour, English Ambassador at St . Petersburg. On
.-
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both occasions, he assumed that the demise of the
Ottoman Empire was approaching and proposed to come
to an understanding with Great Britain as to the
partition of the inheritance. Both attempts were un-
successful. But the refusal of the Aberdeen Cabinet
even to consider these proposals formed one of the
proximate causes of the Crimean War as Nicholas re-
ceived the erroneous impression that he could count
on the extreme cordiality of his relations with
Aberdeen and the English Court.
During and immediately following the
Revolutions of 1848, Nicholas was recognized as the
most powerful monarch in Europe. His policy of re
action and repression saved the Austrian and Prussian
thrones and his attitude toward the Hungarian refugees
in Turkey created another crisis. Because of the
intercession of Palmerston and the English Cabinet,
Nicholas decided to bide his time in forcing his
influence upon the Porte. But the distrust of the
Liberals of Europe toward him was more bitter than
ever. At this time also, his diplomatic insult to
Louis Napoleon, in calling him nMon cher ami" instead
of the usual salutation of Emperors, "Sire, mon frfere”
created the personal hatred of the new French Emperor
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which has its significance in Napoleon’s desire to
ally France with England against Russia in the Crimean
War
.
Undoubtedly Napoleon was the immediate
fire-brand, and insofar as the Crimean War was the
logical development of the dispute concerning the Holy
Places, he must share a fair measure of the responsi-
bility. This question was settled in April 1853 by
Lord Stratford, to the satisfaction of all concerned.
But the Tzar had taken advantage of the difficulties
of the Sublime Porte to include in the charges en-
trusted to Menschikoff which had been separated
from the issue of the Holy Places by Stratford a
demand for the protectorate by Russia over the Greek
Christians of the Ottoman Empire. When, upon the ad-
vice of the English Ambassador, this demand was re-
fused, Menschikoff left Constantinople; and Russian
troops occupied the Principalities (July, 1853)
.
The 'European Powers were alarmed at this
action and joined to draft a document, known as the
Vienna Note, which purported to recognize the legiti-
mate claims of Russia without prejudice to the sovereign-
ty of the Sultan. Since this note differed but little
from that of Menschikoff ’ s mission, it v/as accepted
by the Tzar. But the Turks, again at the advice of
..
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Stratford, refused to adopt it without certain
amendments which changed the character of the Note
by making it explicit that the Christians of the
Empire were to be under the protection of the Sub-
lime Porte. These amendments were in turn declined
by the Tzar. The Pour Powers would probably have
stood by their original decision, had not a confi-
dential dispatch of the Russian Chancellor, Nessel-
rode, been published which showed that the Russian
interpretation of the Vienna Note was precisely in
the sense that the Turkish modifications were de-
signed to prevent, and contrary to the views and
intentions of the Four Powers. England and France,
therefore, refused to force the Note on the Porte.
Before further action could be taken,
Turkey, confident that France and Great Britain
would not leave her to the mercy of Russia for
their fleets had been near the Dardanelles since
early summer declared war on Russia, October 23,
1853. The Four Powers,- still hoping to restore peace
between Russia and Turkey before actual hostilities
commenced, agreed on December 5th to the Second
Vienna Protocol, on the basis of which the Porte
was asked to state its terms.
.•-
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Once again diplomacy was handicapped by
the march of events. On November 30th a Turkish
squadron in the harbor of Sinope had been destroyed
by the Russians, and the answer of the Porte was
substantially a repetition of its original offer to
Russia. Nevertheless the Turkish note was adopted
by the Vienna Conference and communicated to St.
Petersburg. Unfortunately, on the same day the
Tzar learned that the French and English governments,
aroused to indignation by the "massacre of Sinope",
had ordered their fleets to the Black Sea with in-
structions to prevent any Russian men-of-war from
leaving port. His counter proposals were rejected
by the Vienna Conference, but Napoleon III wrote an
autograph letter to Nicholas proposing that the Rus-
sian troops should withdraw from the Black Sea, and
Russia should negotiate directly with Turkey the
terms agreed upon to be submitted to the Concert of
Europe. This overture of the French Emperor was
quite definitely rejected; whereupon, at the sugges-
tion of Austria and on the understanding that she
would support them, the Western Powers demanded the
evacuation of the Principalities by April 30,1854.
But it developed that the Austrian support was
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diplomatlc only. The Tzar therefore made no reply
to the ultimatum, and on March 27th and 28th France
and Great Britain declared war.
Responsibility for the Crimean War
The responsibility for any war is a
matter of relativity, nor is the Crimean War an ex-
ception. But it must be remembered that the funda-
mental point at issue, which is frequently lost sight
of in attributing the war to Stratford or Napoleon or
Nicholas, was the future of the Ottoman Empire. In
the settlement of this question, each of the nations
involved had its own particular motives which re-
sulted in a diplomatic controversy, culminating in
war.
It had been evident for some time that
Nicholas intended to secure a protectorate, recognized
by the Porte, over the Greek Christian subjects of
the Sultan, and^never receded from that programme.
But understanding the certain opposition to this from
the other powers, he sought to detach one or more of
them from the Concert. As early as 1844, during his
visit to St. James, he attempted to gain English ap-
proval; and again in 1852. Unsuccessful in this, he
sought the neutrality of Austria and Prussia Count
Orloff's mission to Vienna and Baron Budberg’s to
.,
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Berlin . He failed to accomplish this also; but
his pride, a belief in the justice of his cause, and
high confidence in his military strength led him to
refuse all concessions. He frequently professed his
intention to respect the integrity of the Ottoman
Empire, but he was clearly formulating plans for its
partition and disposition. The principal cause of
the Crimean War was then, the continued effort of
Russia, after the question of the Holy Places had
been regulated, to carry through a policy which would
have profoundly disturbed the status quo in the Near
East. Whether the diplomacy of the powers opposed
to this policy was conducted in the manner best cal-
culated to restrain the Tzar is another question.
/
There can be no doubt that Napoleon III
contributed his share in bringing about the war by
interfering in the disputes of the Latin and Greek
churches. He definitely was the first to disturb the
status quo and without his interference the quarrel
would have been settled without drawing in the Euro-
pean Powers. Simpson claims, "that the prime respon-
sibility for the Crimean War must rest upon Louis
Napoleon: upon the proverbial sensitiveness of a
parvenu personally affronted by the Czar’s refusal
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to call him ’Brother’; upon the political necessity
of gaining support of the French clericals and the
military necessity of blooding his army on some body
other than French, all of these statements which
have become truisms without ever having been truths.
In reality the figure of Louis Napoleon is big
enough to carry neither praise nor blame such as this. n
^
After the dispute of the Holy Places had been settled,
the diplomatic conduct of France became pacific and
conciliatory. The impetuous ambassador, M.de Lavalette
v/as recalled, and the French government submitted to
the compromise demanded by Russia and recommended by
Stratford. Throughout the long negotiations, the
French Foreign Office sought to preserve the Concert
of the Four Powers as the best means of exerting pres-
sure upon Russia. Nevertheless, less moderation v/as
observed by Napoleon, who urged that the English fleet
join the French in naval demonstrations. In sending
the autograph letter to Nicholas, the French Emperor
probably wanted to keep in the forefront of great
events and strengthen his position at home and abroad.
If the ambition of the Tzar was the principal cause
of the Crimean War, the policy of Napoleon, concilia-
tory enough in the diplomatic channels, but provocative
1. Simpson, p.229-230
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in insisting upon naval manoeuvres, made a peaceful
solution difficult.
The cabinet in England "drifted” into
the war for want of a more resolute and decided policy.
Profoundly influenced by the doctrines of the peace
party, Aberdeen was not strong enough to withstand
the pressure put upon him by Sir Stratford Canning
and Lord Palmerston. He was forced by the dissension
within his Cabinet to resort to half measures which
lost any effectiveness a show of real force might
have had upon Nicholas. Both Aberdeen and Clarendon
failed to make the Tzar realize, on the eve of his
the
occupation of the principalities, how deeply/English
people would resent his aggression. Furthermore, the
Cabinet allowed itself to be gradually drawn into a
separate union with France and thus the chief security
for the maintenance of peace,, which depended upon the
united action of the Four Great Powers, was destroyed.
Two other serious errors were made by the Cabinet
through Clarendon: (1) the hasty acceptance of the
Vienna Note before ascertaining the attitude of the
Porte and of Stratford; and (2) the precipitous ulti-
matum sent to Russia without first being assured of
the military, as well as diplomatic, support of
Austria
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In spite of these blunders, it seems
evident that the Crimean War was not to be averted
by diplomacy. Russia was resolved upon war long be-
fore it actually broke out. The English people
looked upon Russia as a strong power trying to mal-
treat a weak one. They remembered the oppressive
measures of the Tzar in 1848-49 and his interference
with the Hungarian refugees. They also were influ-
enced by a long standing dread of Russian expansion
into regions too near the route to India. The war
movement was popular and before long the pacifist
element was carried along with the tide.
It is necessary to comment briefly on
the exact role of Sir Stratford Canning, who has been
looked upon as the instigator of the war by several
historians of the period. What Stratford did was to
make the war impossible to a moral state by inducing
the Turks to grant the Russian demands so far as
their ostensible object was concerned, but without
giving the Tzar the preponderating influence in Tur-
key which was the real aim of his proposals. In so
doing, Stratford had taken away from the Tzar every
excuse for making v/ar. If supporting a weak state
against a stronger power caused the v/ar, Stratford
v/as so far responsible. His private approval of the
..
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Turk’s rejection of the Vienna Note, one of the high-
lights of the negotiations, has earned for him a mea-
sure of responsibility. But that note granted pre-
cisely v/hat had been all along refused, the Russian
protection of the Greek Church in Turkey; and it was
only the obtuseness or insincerity of the statesmen
who drew it up that was to blame for its rejection.
Altogether, it is not an attractive pic-
ture of English policy, this period of the Crimean
negotiations. The problem was handled in a wavering,
inefficient manner, and reflects a great discredit
upon those responsible for the steering of the Eng-
lish ship of state in the years 1853 and 1854.
The uncertain attitude of Austria was
of no assistance to France and Great Britain in the
final play. She failed to give them the wholehearted
support which would have confronted the Tzar with the
solid front of Europe and might have constrained him
to moderate his demands upon Turkey.
It is customary to judge the Crimean War
by its results as a failure: but a modification of
that judgment is best. In so far as it was concerned
to prevent Russian absorption of Turkey, it was not
a failure. After two centuries Russia was forced to
postpone indefinitely her hope of dominion over the
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Ottoman Empire. Lord Cromer states: "had it not
been for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently
adopted by Lord Beaconfield’ s government the indepen-
dence of the Balkan States would never have been
achieved, and the Russians would how be in possession
of Constantinople
.
1. Marriott p.249
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